Crisis Management: Learning the wrong lessons from Aurora
The day after the tragedy in Aurora, a friend's son announced that he and his friends were going to see the new Batman movie that evening. Her reply? "Absolutely not! Haven't you heard about Aurora?"
Her reaction was not an isolated case. The papers were full of stories from across the country about additional security and law enforcement presence at theaters showing the film. We've also seen heated debates arise about gun control and funding for mental health. Unfortunately, this outcry demonstrates our penchant in the United States for reacting to perceived risk rather than actual risk.
Please don't think I am making light of the tragedy in Aurora – it was a horrific and we are right to study it to glean lessons that can help us prevent future incidents of this type. Nor am I criticizing the actions of security and law enforcement personnel – the threat of copy-cat killings immediately after an incident is real and allaying public concern by being seen to be doing something is a legitimate crisis management tool.
However, as crisis managers we have to see beyond the obvious and look at actual rather than perceived threat. The focus of prevention following the shootings seemed to be specifically on theaters showing the movie and, in some cases, on movie theaters in general. However, while the nature of the movie may have been a motivator for this particular shooter, the real risk is not to the patrons of a specific movie or even to moviegoers. The threat is to large public gatherings.
The threat to public venues such as theaters, malls and restaurants is neither new nor unforeseeable. The 2002 bombing of a night club in Bali killed over 200 and wounded another 200 or so. Carlos the Jackal killed two people and injured another 30 in a grenade attack on a Parisian restaurant in the early 70's. A sword-wielding attacker killed two and wounded 9 people aboard a State Island Ferry in 1986.The list goes on endlessly. The specific venue or choice of weapon are incidental – it is the presence of many people in an enclosed space that creates the risk.
The risk goes beyond movie theaters and begs the question, "so what do we do about it?" It is impossible to eliminate all risk and the tighter our security the more we begin to intrude on personal freedom and run the risk of creating public fear out of proportion to the true risk. A society where we must pass through metal detectors or submit to pat downs and searches before being allowed to go about routine business or leisure activities is one in which the bad guys have already won.
By all means, we must learn from the Aurora massacre but we must also be sure we learn the right lessons. Prevention doesn't always require major changes in public policy or the addition of intrusive security. Sometimes it is as simple as placing an alarm on an exit door and teaching staff to react to it.