Promises Kept: A reflection on 9/11

Posted on September 11, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Promises Kept: A reflection on 9/11

In 2002 I had the privilege of making a few remarks at the unveiling of the new Heroes stamp issued by the US Postal Service to commemorate the events of September 11, 2001. I think I surprised my colleagues by beginning my comments by saying that I didn't think the term "heroes" should be applied to those who served on 9/11. I felt the term was over-used and implied something larger than life – think Hercules and Achilles or Superman and Batman – rather than an average person. In essence, the term tends to turn flesh and blood people into objects of veneration and ignores the courage and humanity of those who serve.

I have yet to meet a firefighter, police officer, or emergency medical technician that considered themselves a "hero". When complimented on something they've done, every single one has told me the same thing, "Hey, I was just doing my job." They are not demi-gods or superhumans – they are just people.  The difference is that they make a promise to be there when they are needed and have the courage to keep that promise, day in and day out, no matter the cost.

This willingness of first responders to hold to their promise is admirably summed up in the song Everyday Heroes written by Dave Carroll. Most people know Dave as the man who wrote the song United Breaks Guitars that went viral on YouTube and has become a case study on the power of social media. What isn't so well known is that Dave has been a volunteer firefighter for years in his hometown and his brother is a full time firefighter. He gets it.

So listen to the song and reflect for a few moments on the men and women who kept their promise on September 11, 2001. Would they have kept that promise if they knew it was going to cost their lives? You know the answer.

Public warning: Misuse can lead to confusion

Posted on August 31, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Public warning: Misuse can lead to confusion

Here's another no-brainer lesson that seems to have to be relearned on a regular basis: use you warning system only for actual warnings.

The City of San Francisco has had a system of warning sirens in place since the Cold War. In 2004 the old air raid sirens were replaced with a modern system. The system is tested every Tuesday at noon. People know this and know that if the if the sirens go off at any other time something is wrong.

Well, maybe. It seems someone in the previous administration thought it would be a good idea for the sirens to be used to signal the end of the Sunday Streets Program and the reopening of the street being used for the gathering. (Sunday Streets is a program of rotating closures of major streets to allow for public recreation.) Last Sunday the on-call technician accidentally activated the entire citywide system rather than just the sirens in the local area. Although the alert was followed by the standard test announcement, the unusual timing resulted in a large volume of calls to the City's emergency services. It didn't help that the Alert SF text warning system that could further have reassured the public that no emergency was occurring wasn't activated until over an hour later.

When I was Director of Emergency Services, I received countless requests to use our warning system for non-emergency purposes. One department head even had the effrontery to activate the system without notifying my office. It was a constant battle to prevent misuse of the system and I didn't always win. 

So here's the lesson: use your warning system for legitimate warnings. If you are using it for a drill, exercise or test, publicize it well in advance and follow up at the time of activation with press releases, SMS messages, tweets, etc. Fight the temptation to use it for civic events. Using your system for multiple purposes increases the chances that it will be ignored when it is really needed.

It also wouldn't hurt to check that bad habits haven't been carried over from previous administrations, as was the case here.The one good thing about this minor incident is that my colleagues from the SF Department of Emergency Management now have the ammunition they need to stop this misuse of the system.

Crisis management and public expectations

Posted on August 27, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Crisis management and public expectations

Here's a no-brainer for crisis managers – if you don't have the capability to do something, don't give the public the impression that you can.

Case in point is the latest controversy over real time monitoring of hazardous substances released in the recent Chevron refinery fire. Media reports both during and immediately after the fire gave the impression that the release was being monitored and that the hazardous materials released did not exceed safety limits. However, the system in use in the Bay Area is designed to measure smog levels. The monitors are activated at specific times and only one was turned on at the time of the fire. Further, the monitors measure specific gases, not particulate matter, and the monitoring levels are not designed for large releases.

Chevron also provides for fence line monitoring around its facility and deployed five employees to take air monitoring samples at 17 locations downwind of the fire. An additional 19 gas bag samples were taken at other locations for later analysis. However, thre is some doubt as to whether the fence line readings are accurate because of the volume of the release and the gas bag samples take several days to analyze. Further, these monitoring systems test for hazardous materials and not for particulates.

The upshot is that there was no real-time monitoring of the event with the exception of the direct reading samples taken downwind. There was no monitoring of particulates which are believed to have been the principal reason over a thousand citizens sought treatment.

There is a reasonable expectation on the part of the public that the government has the means to monitor hazardous materials releases to determine the level of risk to the community. The government in turn generally relies on close cooperation with industry to get this information. To imply that this system is working when it is non-existent not only is a disservice to the public but erodes their trust in government.

Social media and plausible deniability

Posted on August 23, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Social media and plausible deniability

It's no secret that for years government agencies have used euphemisms such "sources close to the investigation" or "source who asked not to be named because they are not authorized to speak for the agency" to leak insider information to the media. This allows the agency to distance itself from any political fallout if the information proves incorrect or if there is public outrage. After all, the information was "unauthorized". However, social media may be putting a new twist on this method.

Last week the state of California's lead investigator for the recent Chevron refinery fire posted comments on his Facebook page critical of the US Chemical Safety Board. The investigator, Clyde Trombetttas, who serves as the Northern California district director for the state's refinery safety program, accused the USCSB of political grandstanding by releasing information prematurely to the media. For example. Trombettas claims that recent statements by the USCSB saying that an idling diesel fire truck was not the source of ignition were made before a physical examination of the vehicle and that suggestions of corrosion in the damaged pipeline that caused the fire were made before any review of plant safety records.

Normally, the posting on social media sites of information related to an ongoing investigation or that could affect inter-agency cooperation is the sort of activity that is expressly forbidden by social media policies. In this case, however, the California Division of Occupational Health and Safety, Trombettas' parent agency, has declined to comment, noting that the comments were made on Trombettas' personal page.

So the question is, is Cal OSHA using Trombettas as a stalking horse to get its problems with the USCSB out in the open or was he acting on his own? Trombettas Facebook page is no longer open to the public but there is nothing yet to indicate that he has been disciplined or replaced as lead investigator. If Trombettas acted on his own, it demonstrates the use of social media as a public voice for those frustrated with bureaucracy. However, if Trombettas acted with the complicity of his superiors at Cal OSHA, it suggests a game change in plausible deniability for government agencies.

Either way, Cal OSHA may want to review its social media policies.

 

 

Chevron refinery fire and the blame game

Posted on August 10, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Chevron refinery fire and the blame game

Every time I follow a crisis, I think of the old Kris Kristofferson song, "Who's to Bless and Who's to Blame?" Anyone that has been in the business of crisis management for any length of time knows that media coverage of a crisis follows three phases:

• What happened? This is the initial coverage of the incident and is focused on the immediate impact of the incident: how many injured, what damaged occurred, etc.
• How did it happen? This phase generally starts the day after an incident as more information becomes available. This where we see the special graphics showing cause and effect and get the expert analyses about what happened.
• Who's fault is it? This phase comes quickly on the heels of the second phase and reflects our habit of fixing blame rather than the problem. We believe, rightly or wrongly, that someone must have caused the incident, either deliberately or through negligence and should be held accountable.

In the aftermath of Monday's explosion and fire at its refinery in Richmond CA, Chevron is clearly well into the third phase of media coverage. The big question that is emerging is whether or not Chevron staff should have shut down the refinery immediately upon finding the leak. Safety experts argue that while the leak appeared minor, it could only get worse and such an escalation could result in a major incident. The implication is that Chevron should have considered this and put the cost of the shut down ahead of the safety of the workers.

I find this type of blame game pointless. The motives behind a bad decision are not really relevant unless they involve criminal negligence and can be distracting. The real issue is how do we prevent similar events. I'm also concerned with other aspects of the crisis that didn't get much mention because we're to busy trying to blame Chevron. Of much more concern to me is that the county-wide warning system took almost ten minutes to activate and proved inadequate to the task of notifying those citizens more at risk.

Meanwhile, Chevron is responding well. The company has accepted full responsibility and is providing compensation for medical and property expenses incurred by citizens. Representatives of the company participated in a rather uncomfortable public meeting. This morning Nigel Hearne, the refinery manager, wrote an editorial for the San Francisco Chronicle apologizing for the incident and reiterating his company's commitment to safety. He also highlighted Chevron's contributions to the community and willingness to work with the community to make improvements.

Whether Chevron's efforts will be enough to get them quickly through the third phase of media attention will depend on how willing the company is to taking swift, concrete action to allay public concern.

Chevron refinery fire provides a lesson in crisis communications

Posted on August 8, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Chevron refinery fire provides a lesson in crisis communications

On Monday evening, a small leak at the Chevron refinery in Richmond CA escalated into a series of explosions and a fire that released a plume of toxic smoke over the Bay Area. One of the things that struck me as I was watching the television coverage of the event was an almost complete lack of information being provided to the media. For the hour or so that I watched, the only official source providing information was the director of the County hazardous materials program and he could only speak to the safety precautions that people should be taking and the action that his agency was taking. There was no word from Chevron or from any of the other local government agencies.

The result was what you would expect. In the absence of any credible source, the television reporters were speculating on what they were seeing and interviewing members of the public. While they did a good job of relaying the shelter-in-place order that had been issued, they really could do little more than show video of the fire and plume.

In dealing with crisis, particularly in this age of instant reporting, you have to get your story out immediately, even if it is just a message to confirm that an incident has occurred and that you are investigating. If you do not, the media will begin to speculate on what is happening and what caused it or will contact outside "experts" who will do the same. The result will be inaccurate and may not be in your best interest. Secondly, the media will seek other sources, such as former employees, experts, or members of the public who will also be speculating on the crisis and may have a bias against your organization.

If you want your story told accurately, get the facts out as quickly as you can. Waiting will only create an information vaccuum that will quickly fill with rumor and speculation.

Decision-making and unintended consequences

Posted on August 3, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Decision-making and unintended consequences

One of the problems with making a decision is that there are almost always unintended consequences to that decision. No matter how you assess and analyze a problem, there's always the risk that your decision will produce results that you never expected. Sometimes you're pleasantly surprised; most times you're not.

Case in point is the State of California's recent decision to reduce overcrowding in state prisons by transferring non-violent criminals to county jails. California  counties are understandably upset by this action as they are receiving no money to house the additional inmates or to construct new jails. This controversy was to be expected. What was not expected or considered was the impact of this move on California's response to wildfires.

California maintains a force of about 4,000 volunteer inmates who are specially trained to fight wildfires. The volunteers are housed in special camps and are available for immediate deployment, frequently as the first units on scene. When not fighting fires, they provide conservation support such as clearing debris to reduce the potential fire load in California forests. The transfer of inmates to the counties is expected to reduce this force by at least 1,500 within the next few months.

The sticking point seems to be (surprise!) budget dollars. The State maintains that the $46 dollars a day it takes to maintain an inmate at the camps should be paid by the counties as the inmates are county prisoners. The counties say that the volunteers are State firefighting resources and that the State should bear the costs, allowing the counties to use the money for the additional staff they require for the influx of new inmates. In the absence of an agreement, California will lose the services of more than a third of its trained volunteer force.

It will be interesting to see how much this "cost-saving" measure costs the State in the next fire season.

Deepwater Horizon and performance indicators

Posted on July 27, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Deepwater Horizon and performance indicators

The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board has just released its preliminary findings on the Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010 that killed 11 workers and caused a massive spill in the Gulf of Mexico. What makes these findings interesting is that they focus not on the technical failures but on management system deficiencies.

Key among these deficiencies was an over-reliance on personal injury rates as indicators of adequate safety. In essence, reducing or eliminating personal injuries was the primary focus of the safety programs and injury rates were used to measure success. However, BP failed to also consider process safety indicators, such as automatic shutoff system failures, activation of pressure relief devices, or loss of containment of liquids and gases, that could signal potential failures.

What makes this particularly egregious is that these same problems were identified in a 2007 report on the explosion at BP's Texas City TX refinery in 2005.

The lesson here is that we need to be careful in the selection of indicators and understand just what they are measuring and how that relates to our overall program goal. This is not just limited to the safety arena. I've seen many performance indicators that rely solely on objective measures that have no correlation to program success. In the long run, poorly thought out indicators can cost you greatly.

Crisis Management: Learning the wrong lessons from Aurora

Posted on July 25, 2012 by Lucien Canton | Posted in WeblogsLeave a Comment on Crisis Management: Learning the wrong lessons from Aurora

The day after the tragedy in Aurora, a friend's son announced that he and his friends were going to see the new Batman movie that evening. Her reply? "Absolutely not! Haven't you heard about Aurora?"

Her reaction was not an isolated case. The papers  were full of stories from across the country about additional security and law enforcement presence at theaters showing the film. We've also seen heated debates arise about gun control and funding for mental health. Unfortunately, this outcry demonstrates our penchant in the United States for reacting to perceived risk rather than actual risk.

Please don't think I am making light of the tragedy in Aurora – it was a horrific and we are right to study it to glean lessons that can help us prevent future incidents of this type. Nor am I criticizing the actions of security and law enforcement personnel – the threat of copy-cat killings immediately after an incident is real and allaying public concern by being seen to be doing something is a legitimate crisis management tool.

However, as crisis managers we have to see beyond the obvious and look at actual rather than perceived threat. The focus of prevention following the shootings seemed to be specifically on theaters showing the movie and, in some cases, on movie theaters in general. However, while the nature of the movie may have been a motivator for this particular shooter, the real risk is not to the patrons of a specific movie or even to moviegoers. The threat is to large public gatherings.

The threat to public venues such as theaters, malls and restaurants is neither new nor unforeseeable. The 2002 bombing of a night club in Bali killed over 200 and wounded another 200 or so. Carlos the Jackal killed two people and injured another 30 in a grenade attack on a Parisian restaurant in the early 70's. A sword-wielding attacker killed two and wounded 9 people aboard a State Island Ferry in 1986.The list goes on endlessly. The specific venue or choice of weapon are incidental – it is the presence of many people in an enclosed space that creates the risk.

The risk goes beyond movie theaters and begs the question, "so what do we do about it?" It is impossible to eliminate all risk and the tighter our security the more we begin to intrude on personal freedom and run the risk of creating public fear out of proportion to the true risk. A society where we must pass through metal detectors or submit to pat downs and searches before being allowed to go about routine business or leisure activities is one in which the bad guys have already won.

By all means, we must learn from the Aurora massacre but we must also be sure we learn the right lessons. Prevention doesn't always require major changes in public policy or the addition of intrusive security. Sometimes it is as simple as placing an alarm on an exit door and teaching staff to react to it.